Edition 02  ·  09 Jun 2026  ·  Intersegment Fraud

The Invisible Hand in Your Own Pocket

How ADM allegedly moved profit between its own divisions — and why the audited numbers showed something that wasn't there.

Mahesh Ramanujam, FCA, DISA(ICAI) · R. Mahesh & Associates, Chennai · SEC Settlement · January 27, 2026
Case at a Glance
CompanyArcher-Daniels-Midland Company (NYSE: ADM)
RegulatorU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
ActionSettled charges — accounting and disclosure fraud
Settlement$40 million civil penalty (January 27, 2026)
PeriodFiscal years 2019 – 2022
SegmentNutrition (Human and Animal Nutrition)
IndividualsVince Macciocchi, Ray Young (settled); Vikram Luthar (litigated)

A growth story that needed protecting

ADM is one of the world's largest agricultural processing companies — grain, oilseeds, animal feed, human nutrition ingredients, sold to food manufacturers across the globe. For years, investors were told that Nutrition was the future. Not the legacy grain business. Not the commodity trading floors. Nutrition: the higher-margin, faster-growing segment that justified the premium ADM commanded.

The Nutrition division was being touted as delivering 15% to 20% operating profit growth per year. That target was communicated to the market. Analysts built models around it. The segment was the narrative engine of ADM's investment case.

The problem, according to the SEC, was that Nutrition wasn't actually delivering those numbers on its own.

$40M Civil penalty — SEC settlement · January 27, 2026

What intersegment transactions are — and why they matter

Large companies with multiple business divisions often trade with each other internally. ADM's Nutrition segment, for instance, buys raw materials from ADM's Agricultural Services segment. These are real transactions — but they happen entirely within the same corporate boundary.

Accounting standards require that such intersegment sales be conducted at arm's length — prices that approximate what an independent third party would pay. This is not optional. It is a prerequisite for segment reporting to mean anything. When a company reports "Nutrition operating profit: $X," investors are entitled to assume that the costs Nutrition paid for inputs from sister divisions were real market prices, not artificial ones.

When prices between your own divisions are not real, the profits in each division are not real either. The consolidation cancels it out. The segment report does not.

Here is the critical structural point: intersegment transactions eliminate on consolidation. In the consolidated P&L, the profit that Nutrition gains from a below-market purchase from Agriculture is exactly offset by the margin Agriculture loses. Total group profit is unchanged.

But segment-level reporting is not consolidated. Each segment is reported on its own. So if you manipulate the price at which Nutrition buys from Agriculture, you can transfer profit from one segment to another — invisibly, at the group level.

The mechanism: retroactive rebates and price adjustments

The SEC's complaint against former executive Vikram Luthar is specific. When Nutrition was falling short of its operating profit targets for fiscal years 2021 and 2022, adjustments were directed to the intersegment transactions. These adjustments included retroactive rebates and price changes that were not customarily available to third-party customers.

In plain terms: after the fact, after the transactions had already been recorded, the prices were changed. Agriculture was made to sell to Nutrition more cheaply, or give back money already earned, in amounts calculated to close the gap between Nutrition's actual results and its targets.

This is what the adjusted journal entry would have looked like:

Intersegment Adjustment — Illustrative Entry
Dr.
Cr.
Effect: Nutrition's COGS decreases → Nutrition's operating profit increases. Agriculture's revenue decreases by the same amount. Group P&L: zero net impact. Segment P&L: Nutrition looks better. Agriculture looks worse.

The adjustments were not offered to external customers. An independent food manufacturer buying from ADM could not call up and demand a retroactive rebate because a target was being missed. That option existed only within the group — which is precisely why it was not arm's length, and precisely why it was fraud.

Why auditors were looking in the wrong place

This is the forensic lesson that every CA and auditor should carry from this case.

Standard audit procedures are designed around the consolidated entity. Revenue completeness testing, cost cut-off procedures, receivables confirmation, inventory counts — these all operate at the consolidated level or at the individual legal entity level. They are not, by default, designed to interrogate the pricing terms of transactions between two divisions of the same company.

The ADM manipulation was invisible to consolidated audit tests because it cancelled out in consolidation. Group profit was not affected. No revenue was manufactured from thin air in the consolidated accounts. The only place the effect appeared was in segment reporting — which typically receives far less substantive audit attention than the primary financial statements.

Segment reporting lives in the notes. Auditors test that the segmentation methodology is consistently applied and that the numbers add up to the consolidated total. What they do not routinely do is verify that every intersegment price approximates an arm's-length market price.

That gap — between what segment reporting requires and what audit procedures actually test — was the space in which this fraud operated for at least four years.

The numbers behind the growth story

ADM was not a small company hoping nobody would notice. This is a global agribusiness processing billions of dollars of commodities annually. Nutrition was a strategically important segment, publicly positioned as a growth engine, cited in earnings calls, and used to anchor the investment thesis presented to institutional investors.

The SEC found that the manipulation inflated Nutrition's reported performance across fiscal years 2019 through 2022. ADM subsequently restated its financials — twice. The company also dismissed its Chief Financial Officer and experienced significant share price erosion before the matter reached settlement.

4 years Period of alleged inflation · FY 2019 – FY 2022

What the company did right — eventually

The SEC specifically noted ADM's cooperation and significant remedial measures, including self-reporting the matter, implementing a comprehensive new compliance programme, and terminating employees involved in the misconduct. This cooperation is why the penalty, at $40 million, was less severe than it might otherwise have been.

Self-reporting is not nothing. It takes institutional courage to surface a fraud internally and then walk it into the regulator's office. But it does not change the years during which the misrepresentation stood — and it does not change what investors were told, and acted on, in the interim.

What to Watch For

The consolidation cancelled it out. The segment report did not. That asymmetry is where the fraud lived.

Next week, Edition 03: the other half of the ADM story — who had the incentive to do this, what their bonus structures looked like, and why the audit committee did not catch it for four years. The mechanism tells you how. The incentive tells you why. Both matter.

Sources

SEC Press Release No. 2026-15 (Jan. 27, 2026): SEC Charges ADM and Three Former Executives with Accounting and Disclosure Fraud  ·  ADM Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1 (Jan. 27, 2026): ADM Announces Closure of Government Investigations  ·  Michael Volkov, "When Financial Controls Fail: The SEC's ADM Settlement" — Volkov Law Blog (Mar. 5, 2026)  ·  Bloomberg: "ADM to Pay $40 Million to Settle SEC Accounting Fraud Probe" (Jan. 28, 2026)

This newsletter is published for general information and educational purposes only. It is commentary on matters already in the public domain, drawn from official regulatory filings, court records, and press releases. Every case discussed involves allegations that have not been proven; references to any company or individual reflect what regulators or courts have stated and are not assertions of guilt or wrongdoing by the author. ADM settled the SEC's charges without admitting or denying any wrongdoing. This content does not constitute professional, legal, tax, accounting, audit, or investment advice and creates no client or advisory relationship. Views expressed are the author's own.  ·  Red Flags & Footnotes is written by Mahesh Ramanujam, FCA, DISA(ICAI), ICAI Member No. 206817, proprietor of R. Mahesh & Associates, Chartered Accountants, Egmore, Chennai – 600 008. © 2026 R. Mahesh & Associates. All rights reserved.

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